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INTRODUCTION
Calvin William Sharpe*
TODAY, grievance arbitration is the cornerstone of dispute reso-lution under collective bargaining agreements.' In 1987, labor
arbitrators decided approximately 13,400 cases involving public
and private sector labor contracts.2 There are more than 1,000
arbitrators who decide contractual issues that management and
union representatives are unable to resolve bilaterally.' The over-
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.A., Clark
College (1967); J.D., Northwestern University School of Law (1974); Arbitrator; Member
of Labor Panels for the American Arbitration Association, Federal Mediation and Concili-
ation Service, Ohio State Employment Relations Board and various collective bargaining
agreements.
i. A BNA survey of collective bargaining agreements indicates that 100 percent of
the contracts contain a grievance procedure and 99 percent of the contracts contain arbi-
tration clauses. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:1, :5 (Feb. 27, 1986).
2. Arbitrators appointed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
in 1987 issued 4,145 awards in grievance cases. J. MYERS, ARBITRATION STATISTICS FOR
1986 AND 1987 (statistics issued by Jewell L. Myers, Director for Arbitration Services,
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service). Arbitrators appointed by the American Arbi-
tration Association (AAA) closed 9,237 cases. Although some of these cases were settle-
ments the vast majority of them were closed by awards. Telephone interview with Frank
Zotto, Associate Vice President for Case Administration, American Arbitration Associa-
tion (Dec. 30, 1988) [hereinafter Zotto Interview]. To this number must be added the
uncertain number of arbitrators who decide cases by direct appointments.
3. The AAA's Labor Panel lists approximately 3,500 arbitrators; however, less than
half of these arbitrators decided all of the cases conducted under AAA auspices in 1987.
Furthermore, the following statistical breakdown indicates that less than 10% of the panel
members decided more than 70% of the cases.
No. of No. of
Cases Arbit- No. of
Decided rators (%age) Cases (%age)
1 335 (30%) 335 (4%)
2-10 537 (48%) 2247 (24%)
11-20 130 (12%) 1891 (20%)
21-30 62 (5%) 1561 (17%)
31-40 29 (3%) 1043 (11%)
41-50 14 (1%) 636 (7%)
51+ 23 (2%) 1524 (17%)
TOTALS 1130 (101%) 9237 (100%)
Percentages are rounded to the nearest percentage point.
Zotto Interview, supra note 2.
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whelming majority of these arbitration awards are issued by a sin-
gle arbitrator selected on an ad hoc basis by the parties, or from
lists of arbitrators supplied by either the American Arbitration
Association or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.4
Six-hundred and ninety-five of the total pool of arbitrators belong
to the National Academy of Arbitrators - a professional associa-
tion of arbitrators dedicated to advancing the theory and practice
of labor arbitration.5
The modern grievance arbitration case is at the pinnacle of a
pyramid of procedures that encourage pre-arbitral, bilateral set-
tlements.6 Failing early resolution, the parties typically prepare
The following FMCS statistics for 1987 are comparable.
ARBITRATION AWARDS ISSUED BY ARBITRATORS APPOINTED
THROUGH FMCS
No. of Awards Fiscal Year 1987
1 310
2-5 415
6-10 136
11-15 53
16-20 22
21-25 8
26-30 8
31-35 2
36+ 0
TOTAL 954
J. MEYERS, supra note 2. There is a substantial overlap between the lists of arbitrators
maintained by the FMCS and the AAA.
4. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:6-:7 (Feb. 27, 1986).
5. Interview with Paul Gerhart, member of the National Academy of Arbitrators
(Dec. 31, 1988). Because of the minimum case admission standards, NAA members also
tend to have the highest acceptability among arbitrators.
6. A BNA survey indicates that the most common one is a three-step procedure. The
first step requires the employee to submit a timely written grievance to his immediate su-
pervisor, either alone or in the presence of a union representative. Typically, management
must respond at this step in writing within the timetable established in the procedure.
Many contracts permit unions and management, as well as employees, to file grievances,
and the majority of contracts permit the special handling of certain kinds of grievances
through expedited procedures. At the second step, mid-level union representatives, such as
members of an in-company grievance procedure or a shop steward, and company represent-
atives, such as industrial relation personnel, typically handle the grievance. At the final
step, the union's international representatives and industrial relations directors are the most
common representatives. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:1-:4 (Feb. 27,
1986).
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testimonial and documentary evidence for a hearing before the ar-
bitrator. As in the average administrative law case, this evidence
is sandwiched between opening statements and closing arguments
that place each party's best gloss on the evidence. The hearing
typically accords the parties, including the individual grievant, ac-
cess to relevant evidence, the opportunity to be present at the
hearing, the right to have representation and to call and cross-
examine witnesses, as well as other safeguards required by the
right to due process. The arbitrator's award is usually binding and
in writing, and typically contains a statement of the reasons for
the arbitrator's decision.7 The continued reliance of labor and
management representatives upon this process is the most elo-
quent testimony to its dominance in the labor relations system.
Grievance arbitration also enjoys a prestigious status in labor
law. In the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) Congress ex-
plicitly acknowledged the importance of private settlement proce-
dures in several statutory provisions.8 In key decisions, the Su-
preme Court has recognized the pre-eminence of arbitration in
labor contract enforcement and has defined a very limited but
7. See VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULES 19-22, 26, 38 & 45 (American Ar-
bitration Association 1979); CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF
LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AND FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE pt. 5,
§ E (1974).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1986) provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158(b) of this title,
the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of
which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after
notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the
Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for
the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the
dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the
dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.
In addressing functions of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 29 U.S.C. §
173(d) (1986) provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared
to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The
Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available in
the settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional
cases.
For a statement of policy regarding the conciliation of labor disputes, see the National
Labor Relations Act, ch. 120, § 201, 61 Stat. 152 (1947)(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 171
(1986)).
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supportive role for the courts in arbitration cases.' The Court also
has acknowledged the importance of arbitration in cases where
contractual claims involving non-NLRA statutory rights are being
adjudicated.10 In addition, the National Labor Relations Board
has enunciated a deferral policy that makes arbitration the princi-
pal process for resolving many arbitrable NLRA disputes."
Arbitration's current lofty position in the American labor re-
lations arena was evolutionary.' 2 While some mistakenly attribute
the genesis of modern grievance arbitration to the National War
Labor Board of World War II (NWLB),13 several careful com-
mentators have placed its birth at 1871.14 Most observers, how-
ever, acknowledge that the NWLB was influential in shaping the
current system.15 Some of these observers, while acknowledging
the NWLB's role in shaping modern grievance arbitration, argue
that its influence was untoward.'
Notwithstanding these debates, the World War II emergency
created conditions for the nourishment and perhaps accelerated
growth of grievance arbitration as we know it. The uninterrupted
9. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987); W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960).
10. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)(holding that plaintiff was
entitled to pursue a remedy for a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act through
both the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement and through the
federal courts).
11. See United Technologies, 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B.
573 (1984). See generally Sharpe, NLRB Deferral to Grievance Arbitration" A General
Theory, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 595 (1987).
12. To compare the American system to several European systems where arbitration
is seldom used, see Wood, Hepple & Johnston, United Kingdom, 9 CoMP. LAB. Li. 198,
200-02 (1987); Rojot, France, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 68, 71 (1987); Fahlbeck, Sweden, 9
CoMp. LAB. L.J. 177, 179 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Raffaele, Lawyers in Labor Arbitration, 37 ARB. J. 14, 14 (1982).
14. In 1871, Judge William Elwell of Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania was chosen by the
Anthracite Board of Trade and the Committee of the Workingmen's Benevolent Associa-
tion to decide questions involving job interference and wrongful discharge. R. FLEMING,
THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROcEss 2 (1965); E. WITTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR
ARBITRATION 11 (1952); Nolan & Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early
Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373, 379 (1983). See also Jacoby & Mitchell, Origins of the
Union Contract, 33 LAB. L.J. 512, 515 (1982).
15. See, e.g., E. WITTE, supra note 14, at 48-51; Jacoby & Mitchell, supra note 14,
at 516-17; Nolan & Abrams, supra note 14, at 420-21; Nolan & Abrams, American Labor
Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557, 575-77 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Lichtenstein, Industrial Democracy, Contract Unionism, and the Na-
tional War Labor Board, 33 LAB. L.J. 524 (1982).
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production of goods and services was vital to the war effort. The
recognition of this national security priority by responsible leaders
of labor and management led to the "no-strike/no lockout" pledge
and to President Roosevelt's establishment of the NWLB to re-
solve labor disputes that might affect the country's war effort.1 7
17. The following excerpt from the text of President Roosevelt's Executive Order
No. 9017, Establishment of the National War Labor Board, reflects the contents of the
unpublished agreement between labor and management on December 17, 1941 as well as
the theory and structure of the NWLB:
WHEREAS, by reason of the state of war declared to exist by joint resolu-
tions of the Congress, approved December 8, 1941 and December 11, 1941, re-
spectively, (Public Laws Nos. 328, 331, 332, 77th Congress), the national inter-
est demands that there shall be no interruption of any work which contributes to
the effective prosecution of the war; and
WHEREAS, as a result of a conference of representatives of labor and in-
dustry which met at the call of the President on December 17, 1941, it has been
agreed that for the duration of the war there shall be no strikes or lockouts, and
that all labor disputes shall be settled by peaceful means, and that an National
War Labor Board be established for the peaceful adjustment of such disputes:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Con-
stitution and the statutes of the United States, it is hereby ordered:
1. There is hereby created in the Office for Emergency Management a
National War Labor Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board. The Board
shall be composed of twelve special commissioners to be appointed by the Presi-
dent. Four of the members shall be representative of the public; four shall be
representative of employees; and four shall be representative of employers. The
President shall designate the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Board from
the members representing the public. The President shall appoint four alternate
members representatives of employees and four representative of employers, to
serve as Board members in the absence of regular members representative of
their respective groups. Six members of alternate members of the Board, includ-
ing not less than two members from each of the groups represented on the
Board, shall constitute a quorum. A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the
right of the remaining members to exercise all the powers of the Board
2. This Order does not apply to labor disputes for which procedures for
adjustment or settlement are otherwise provided until those procedures have
been exhausted.
3. The procedures for adjusting and settling labor disputes which might
interrupt work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war shall be
as follows: (a) The parties shall first resort to direct negotiations or to the proce-
dures provided in a collective bargaining agreement. (b) If not settled in this
manner, the Commissioners of Conciliation of the Department of Labor shall be
notified if they have not already intervened in the dispute. (c) If not promptly
settled by conciliation, the Secretary of Labor shall certify the dispute to the
Board, provided, however, that the Board in its discretion after consultation with
the Secretary may take jurisdiction of the dispute on its own motion. After it
takes jurisdiction, the Board shall finally determine the dispute, and for this pur-
pose may use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under rules estab-
lished by the Board.
4. The Board shall have power to promulgate rules and regulations appro-
priate for the performance of its duties.
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The labor-management pledge was voluntary and was moti-
vated by a particular sense of responsibility. From the outset, the
NWLB's view was that labor disputes were best handled by the
6. Upon the appointment of the Board and the designation of its Chair-
man, the National Defense Mediation Board established by Executive Order No.
8716 of March 19, 1941, shall cease to exist. All employees of the National
Defense Mediation Board shall be transferred to the Board without acquiring by
such transfer any change in grade or civil service status. All records, papers, and
property, and all unexpended funds and appropriations for the use and mainte-
nance of the National Defense Mediation Board shall be transferred to the
Board. All duties with respect to cases certified to the National Defense Media-
tion Board shall be assumed by the Board for discharge under the provisions of
this Order.
7. Nothing herein shall be construed as superseding or in conflict with the
provisions of the Railway Labor Act (Act of May 20, 1926, as amended, 44
Stat. 577; 48 Stat. 926, 1185; 49 Stat. 1169; 45 U.S. Code 151), The National
Labor Relations Act (Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 457; 29 U.S. Code 151 et
seq.), the Fair Labor Standards Act (Act of June 25, 1938; 52 Stat. 1060; 29
U.S. Code 201 et seq.), and the Act to provide conditions for the purchase of
supplies, etc., approved June 30, 1936 (49 Stat. 2036; 41 U.S. Code, sections 35-
45), or the Act amending the Act of March 3, 1931, relating to the rate of
wages for laborers and mechanics, approved August 30, 1935 (49 Stat. 1011; 40
U.S. Code, Section 276 et seq.).
Exec. Order No. 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (1938-1943).
Executive Order No. 9017 was amended on January 24, 1942, by Executive Order
No. 9038, to provide for the appointment of associate members of the Board. Executive
Order No. 9038 follows in text:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes
of the United States, it is hereby ordered that Executive Order No. 9017 of
January 12, 1942, entitled "Establishment of the National War Labor Board,"
be, and it is hereby, amended so as to provide for the appointment of associate
members of the National War Labor Board. Such associate members shall be
authorized to act as Mediators in any labor dispute pursuant to the direction of
the Board.
Associate members shall receive compensation and expenses during any pe-
riod of service in like manner as regular members of the Board.
Exec. Order No. 9038, 3 C.F.R. 1082 (1938-1943).
The scope of the Board's authority was extended by Executive Order No. 9250, issued
October 3, 1942, in two respects:
1. (Title II, § 1] No increases in wage rates, granted as a result of volun-
tary agreement, collective bargaining, conciliation, arbitration, or otherwise, and
no decreases in wage rates, shall be authorized unless notice of such increases or
decreases shall have been filed with the National War Labor Board, and unless
the National War Labor Board has approved such increases or decreases.
[2. (Title III, § 1)] Except as modified by this Order, the National War
Labor Board shall continue to perform the powers, functions, and duties con-
ferred upon it by Executive Order No. 9017, and the functions of said Board are
hereby extended to cover all industries and all employees.
Exec. Order No. 9250, 3 C.F.R. 1213 (1938-1943).
[Vol. 39:505
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parties' own efforts and procedures rather than by government in-
tervention.18 This point of view coincided with freedom of contract
principles embodied in the NLRA and an American tradition of
collective bargaining that featured bilaterally determined terms
and conditions of employment. 9 This policy preference for private
dispute settlement arrangements, plus the NWLB's logistical in-
ability to decide the thousands of potentially disruptive grievance
disputes that arose during the war, led the Board to articulate
strong pro-arbitration policies.20
18. Lichtenstein, supra note 16, at 524.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1986) provides:
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obli-
gation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the mak-
ing of a concession ....
Id. (emphasis supplied). See N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1-50
(1965).
20. Volume nine of the War Labor Reports carried the following release:
Declaring that maximum production of war materials requires prompt set-
tlement of plant grievances, the National War Labor Board today instructed its
12 regional boards to do everything possible to promote the widest utilization of
arbitration as the final step in the grievance machinery of labor-management
contracts.
Chairman William H. Davis sent letters to chairmen of the regional war
labor boards emphasizing that "maximum production during the war is a duty;
the duty is not discharged when production is impaired by lowered morale or
strikes caused by the failure to settle grievances."
Mr. Davis warned that, if employers and unions did not provide in their
contract for the final and binding settlement of all grievances by an arbitrator,
impartial chairman or umpire under terms and conditions agreed to by the par-
ties, the WLB. is likely to set up such machinery itself as the cases come to the
Board. The WLB has established such machinery in many cases in the past, he
pointed out.
The Chairman's letter elaborated on the Board's formal statement of July
1, 1943, urging prompt settlement of grievances within the plant, without refer-
ence of cases to the WLB.
Chairman Davis told regional chairmen that he wished "to bring to your
attention again the importance attributed by the Board to the prompt and gen-
eral acceptance of the principles enunciated in its July statement" and "to sug-
gest to yourself and to all members of your Regional Board the great interest of
this Board in making these principles known to the public."
The letter continued:
"You will recall that the Board stated that certain fundamental values and
aids to the prosecution of the war can be attained by grievance procedures which
provide:
I. That prompt initial attention be given to the grievance by those in the
1988-891
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For the thousands of parties who were subject to the Board's
plant who have intimate knowledge of the dispute. The exact steps and proce-
dures for such attention to grievances must be adapted to the needs of the plant
and can best be worked out by the parties themselves.
Doubtless, a variety of reasons exist to explain either the failure of employ-
ers and unions to have established in their contracts a method of adjusting day-
to-day grievances, or the failure of the parties to make effective use of such a
grievance procedure. But one important factor that often accounts for accumu-
lated grievances is the distraction and occupation of plant officials with daily
business of producing war materials, without a clear recognition of the close
connection between a good production record and the adjustment of grievances.
The Board has restated what is clear: Maximum production during the war
is a duty; the duty is not discharged when production is impaired by lowered
morale or strikes caused by the failure to settle grievances. The duty to achieve
and maintain production implies, therefore, the establishment of grievance pro-
cedure and the prompt settlement of grievances according to that procedure. The
implications of the Board's July 1 statement are not hidden. They reveal a con-
tinued determination by the Board to work out and establish a grievance proce-
dure for the parties if they don't do it themselves and to require that they use it
once they do.
The Board in its statement concerning the attainment of certain fundamen-
tal American values and aids to the successful prosecution of war said also:
2. That the grievance procedure, whatever be its adaptation to the plant,
should provide for the final and binding settlement of all grievances not other-
wise resolved. For this purpose provision should be made for settlement of griev-
ances by an arbitrator, impartial chairman, or umpire under terms and condi-
tions agreed to by the parties.
In the task of making the American industrial public conscious of the desir-
ability of both establishing and promptly using a grievance procedure, it might
be useful to demonstrate both the obvious connection between the maximum
production and the settlement of grievances, and the usefulness to the employer
himself of a grievance machinery that ends in arbitration. Even those employers
who may have an immature industrial relations viewpoint will frequently wish to
settle real grievances. The results of failure to do so are often too serious to
neglect. If there is a tendency for a union representing the employees or of union
organizers to build up grievances, or inability to hold them down because of
immature union discipline, it will be of real advantage to be able to distinguish
between real and fake grievances. . . .The provision for final arbitration of
grievances, if it is coupled with reasonable provisions as to time intervals, will
enable experienced arbitrators to differentiate between real and imaginary
grievances.
But whether or not employers and unions are sold on the idea of arbitration
within the grievance procedure, it must be emphasized here, as before, that the
Board has expressly indicated that the failure of the parties to provide for such
arbitration is likely to result (as it has so often resulted in the past) in the estab-
lishment of such arbitration by this Board.
The expression of the Board's attitude on these questions should be made
available to all interested parties continuously and persistently. On this subject
the Board is not content to relax after having issued its statement of July 1."
The statement also called upon the parties to take the following action:
1. To install adequate procedures for the prompt, just, and final settlement
of the day-to-day grievances involving the interpretation and application of the
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jurisdiction, final and binding grievance arbitration, often by
Board order, became the ultimate means of resolving grievance
disputes.21 As union membership increased, collective bargaining
expanded and arbitration provisions, along with the number of ar-
bitrators, grew. 2 Thus, an increase in the number of arbitrators
was a direct result of NWLB policies. In addition, key Board de-
cisions and policy directives established the Board's deference to
grievance arbitration and reinforced the pre-eminence of private
dispute settlement.2 3
These developments encouraged the widespread, post-war use
of arbitration. The NWLB's effective employment of arbitration
demonstrated its broad utility in settling grievance disputes. Nec-
essarily, this example of success validated the NWLB's policy
statements regarding deferral to the decisions of arbitrators and
the finality of arbitration. Moreover, in order to assure that the
increased demand for arbitration would be met, a cadre of arbi-
trators, who refined their craft in war labor disputes, was available
for post-war service to the parties and the burgeoning profession.
Thus, the NWLB was a short-lived "institutional catalyst" that
contract.
2. To make the full functioning of the grievance procedure a major re-
sponsibility under the no-strike, no-lockout agreement for maximum production
to win the war.
Instructions to Regional War Labor Boards: Importance of Grievance Machinery, 9 War
Lab. Rep. XXIV-XXV (1944)(National War Labor Board Memorandum Release, issued
July 24, 1943).
21. See Chrysler Corp., 10 War Lab. Rep. 551, 555 (1943).
22. See E. WITTE, supra note 14, at 45-51.
23. For example, in a harbinger of United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), the NWLB said in its Statement Of Policy Concerning Re-
view of Arbitration Awards (September 1, 1943):
A. Private Arbitration.- 1. Where the parties have themselves agreed to
submit their non-wage dispute to an arbitrator whose decision they have agreed
to accept as final and binding, the Board will not review the award on the merits
even though, at the request of the parties or because of their inability to agree
on an arbitrator, it has appointed the arbitrator. If, however, the Board finds
that in rendering his award, the arbitrator has exceeded the terms of the submis-
sion agreement, the Board may modify the award to that extent only.
2 THE TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 694 (1947). See also
Smith & Wesson, Inc., 10 War Lab. Rep. 148 (1943), where the NWLB adopted a sound
common law principle extolling the value of arbitral finality and held that it would not
review the merits of an arbitrator's award. In accepting its "rule and rationale" the Board
cited the following languauge from Sweet v. Morrison, 116 N.Y. 19, 33, 22 N.E. 276, 280
(1889): "The merits of an award, however unreasonable or unjust it may be, cannot be
reinvestigated, for otherwise the award, instead of being the end of the litigation, would
simply be a useless step in its progress." Smith & Wesson, Inc., 10 War Lab. Rep. 148,
153 (1943).
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accelerated the predominance of arbitration as a means of settling
grievance disputes.24
In an attempt to gain additional insights into the relationship
between modern grievance arbitration and the NWLB, the follow-
ing oral history symposium presents the views and recollections of
four distinguished arbitrators who served as top level officials on
the War Labor Board.
The prologue by Judge Jack G. Day, who was Chairman of
the Kansas City Regional War Labor Board, sets the NWLB in
its philosophical context. His concise and pithy discussion of "in-
dustrial pluralism" helps to explain the procedures that evolved
out of NWLB practice and flourished in the post-war years. Pro-
fessor Aaron, former Executive Director of the NWLB, combines
his customarily thorough research with personal recollections to
provide a comprehensive treatment of the role of the NWLB in
spurring the development of grievance arbitration and familiar
rules related to the process. He then treats separately the question
of arbitral quality and efficiency. Next, Mr. Gill, once a public
member of the NWLB and chairman of the Cleveland Regional
War Labor Board, discusses an early controversy within the arbi-
tration profession over the nature of arbitration. Anecdotally, he
contributes special insights demonstrating that the arbitrator's
role has historically defied convenient pigeonholing. Finally, Mr.
Garrett, who chaired the Philadelphia Regional War Labor
Board, weaves relevant early personal experiences and recent legal
developments into a policy-oriented discussion about the scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards.
24. In biological science the catalyst accelerates a chemical reaction without itself
being permanently changed by the reaction. See W. KEETON. BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 69-70
(3d ed. 1980). The NWLB analogy seems appropriate, since the temporary agency's poli-
cies and procedures undisputedly accelerated the broad use of grievance arbitration.
[Vol. 39:505
